FELLOWSHIP

April 1945 PART TWO Vol. XI—No. 4

IS OUR ONLY CHOICE

Dumbarton Oaks or Chaos?

By A. J. MUSTE

OUR PEOPLE are being told that if the United States does not enter the Dumbarton Oaks security organization and back the Yalta decisions, the alternative is "too horrible to contemplate." What does this mean?

If we do not accept Dumbarton Oaks and the Yalta agreement—

Will Russia pull out of the war and leave us to fight on alone?
Will war break out in Europe between Russian and British-American forces?
Will the military alliance of Russia, Great Britain and the U. S. collapse?
Will all possibility of world co-operation be lost, and chaos and a third world war ensue?

The answer in each case is "NO." We must stop being intimidated and terrorized by the slogan "Dumbarton Oaks or Chaos." The discussion that follows tells you why, and sets forth a better alternative.

FOREWORD

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE upon which Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt decided early in February at Yalta in the Crimea will convene in San Francisco on April 25, 1945. The tentative plan for an international organization drafted last year at Dumbarton Oaks by representatives of Russia, Britain, and the United States is there to be submitted to the representatives of 39 nations. If an agreement is reached at San Francisco that agreement will undoubtedly be embodied in a bill which will be submitted to the United States Senate for ratification.

The next few weeks leading up to the San Francisco Conference are, therefore, critical ones for the people of this nation and in particular for the churches. Once San Francisco has acted and a treaty embodying its conclusion is before the United States Senate, we shall be told: "It is this or nothing; this or chaos." Whether or not that will be true then, *it is not true now that we must take "Dumbarton Oaks or Chaos."* Now is precisely the time to work and pray mightily to reject the violations of the Atlantic Charter which were decreed at Yalta and to effect drastic changes in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Many governments even are highly critical of Dumbarton Oaks. On the day this introductory note is being written *the French Government has announced its refusal to join Russia, Britain, China and the United States in issuing the invitation to the San Francisco Conference because it desires to have a free hand in advocating changes.* On the same day the press announced that the Inter-American Conference meeting at Mexico City had voted to forward to the delegates to San Francisco proposals for important changes. In view of the grave moral issues admittedly involved, it would surely be tragic if churches and churchmen were virtually to acquiesce in the proposals of the big powers while secular statesmen protest and call vigorously for amendment and improvement.

Now and in the weeks just ahead is the time for the people to speak out and for the spokesmen of the churches to give leadership to them.

I. "Unconditional Surrender"

There are any number of places where we might take hold and begin our analysis of recent events which furnish the background for the issues now confronting the American people. Since their hopes that the war with Germany would end by Christmas 1944 were dashed and their thoughts were instead gloomily occupied during that season with a German counter-offensive and apprehension over the casualty lists, this may be as good a point as any for a start. Last summer it looked as though German resistance was about to collapse and the Nazi regime to disintegrate as did the Kaiser's in 1918. The unsuccessful plot to assassinate Hitler was for many a symbol of this collapse and a prophecy of speedy victory and then peace.

It is clear that shortly thereafter a drastic change occurred in Germany. Many of the aspects of the new turn and the reasons therefor we do not know and probably shall not until, years from now, the historians write the history

of these times. Wars are always fought in the dark; to use Matthew Arnold's words, "on a darkling plain—where ignorant armies clash by night." But there was one chief cause for the stiffened and prolonged German resistance which was soon recognized by informed commentators. For example, the *London Economist*—a highly respectable organ which exercises the influence that a combination of *Wall Street Journal* and *New Republic* might in this country—late in 1944 and early in the present year printed some extremely vigorous criticisms of Churchill on the one hand and United States attitudes and policies on the other. It called on Churchill to stop "appeasing" both Stalin and Roosevelt and charged that the "unconditional surrender" policy was largely responsible for the stiffening German resistance, the needless prolongation of the war, and the consequent loss of British, Canadian, French, and American lives on the Western Front. Recently this charge was confirmed by an investigation among Germans in occupied territory which was conducted by the Psychological Warfare Division of the U.S. First Army on the Western Front and reported in the *New York Times,* March 17, 1945.

This policy of saying to the German people: "Surrender and we'll tell you afterward what we shall do with you" is, as recent revelations have made clear, partly the result of the secret diplomacy, the "deals" unknown to the people and even to most of their officials, which characterize every war. It is doubtful, however, whether this dangerous and utterly undemocratic procedure has ever been carried farther than in this war when the important decisions are made in private conference by three men—Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt. The "deal" which accompanied the adoption of the "unconditional surrender" policy and slogan goes back to the Casablanca Conference and is thus described by one of the *New York Times'* crack correspondents, C. L. Sulzberger, in the issue of December 17, 1944: "Mr. Roosevelt ardently urged the adoption of the 'unconditional surrender' policy by the Allies. Mr. Churchill was reluctant to support such an out-and-out statement. . . . It was felt that this would tend to stiffen the Germans' resolve. Finally, however, Mr. Churchill agreed to accept and endorse the policy. As a *quid pro quo* he insisted that as between Britain and the United States, Britain have complete charge of the Allies' military operations and corollary diplomatic policy in the Middle East and the Balkans. This was accepted by Mr. Roosevelt!" Thus is the fate of nations settled and thus national war-leaders bargain with the lives of men and boys.

What to Do with Germany?

One of the reasons, perhaps the chief one, why this senseless and harmful phrase has continued to represent Allied policy is that the Big Three did not know what the policy toward Germany was to be, and they did not know because they could not agree among themselves about it. There were even indications that neither the Russian, the British, nor the American government knew what it wanted to do with Germany. In Russian pronouncements one could find side by side such conflicting statements as that the German people were not to be injured nor the German Army destroyed, and that the Germans would be put at forced labor in Russia and the entire population of Germany held responsible for Nazi crimes. Both British and Americans have been torn between a determination to banish fear of Germany by taking the most extreme measures that might be necessary in order to make it "forever impossible" for Germany to rebuild an army and, on the other hand, the recognition that unless the peace is of such a character that the masses of the German people will themselves be interested to maintain it, it cannot endure.

No one in recent months has suggested more graphically than Dorothy Thompson what this "unconditional surrender" policy would mean for Germany and the Germans. As she observed "Germany, being an identity and an entity, cannot surrender, because there is no identity or entity to which she can deliver herself." As we shall have occasion to point out later, Russia and Great Britain, more recently also France, have been in process of mapping out "spheres of influence" in Europe and elsewhere according to the familiar power politics pattern. In this situation various defeated nations have had to surrender to one or another of the Powers rather than to a genuine international organization into which these nations might then be incorporated. Although such conquered or "liberated" countries had to surrender their sovereignty, they retained at least a semblance of national existence; some even attained the distinction of becoming co-belligerents! But Germany was not permitted to surrender as an entity to any one of the Powers; the others would not permit it. And yet there was no international entity to which Germany as an entity might surrender. The coalition among the Big Three—or Four or Five—was always precarious; they could not agree among themselves as to what to do with Germany. Miss Thompson said that "To ask Germany to surrender to such a coalition, which does not exist politically, which has no program commonly applicable to the whole of Germany, and which might fall apart at any minute after Germany's collapse, is something unheard of in history and impossible." The Germans were frightened not so much by harsh peace terms as by the prospect of an "abyss of chaos" as first one section of Germany and then another might be torn off by the conquerors. Miss Thompson also pointed out that the German policy of trying to prolong the war in order to sow dissension among the Allies, for which it was the fashion to excoriate the Nazis and which was constantly played up as the greatest danger to the war effort, was actually an inevitable and the only possible fruitage of the Allies' own policy, or lack of policy. "A woman about to sell herself into slavery rather than continue in starvation, having four would-be masters, can hardly cut herself into quarters to serve them all, but may hold off in the hope that they will fight each other over her body. Such is Germany."

Not long ago I was in a small gathering of university professors. There was talk about the possibility that guerilla warfare might go on in Germany indefinitely and that the country might be devastated by the application of an unprecedently drastic "scorched earth" policy, so that if ever the Allies or any of them took over the land they would inherit only a mass of ruins. Someone suggested that this policy would of course be forced upon the German people by the Nazi terror machine. The person in the group who by common consent was best informed about Germany, a very distinguished refugee, who in the United States has ardently supported the war, said

sorrowfully: "Oh, no, I think it is quite possible that the German people might thus *choose* virtual suicide. After all, what alternative are we offering them?"

One World

Two other observations need to be made relative to the German situation. They apply equally to the Japanese. In the first place, our interventionist and "collective security" friends base their pleas for world organization, Dumbarton Oaks, the use of force against aggressors, and similar measures on the ground that the world is now "One World." One nation can no longer live in isolation from another. They are right in rejecting any possibility of isolationism. But the policy of a dictated peace, of the humiliation of the German and Japanese peoples, the destruction of their economies, the dismemberment of their countries based on the division of the world into "peace-loving" and not peace-loving nations or peoples—is in flat contradiction to the concept of "One World." It is irreconcilable with it. The very thesis which the anti-isolationists advance means that if there is to be peace on earth, there must be peace in Germany, Italy, and Japan; if world-economy is to be restored, the economies of these nations must be restored; if there is to be *any* world-organization, they must be in it. Were it not for the fact that war and its passions blind us, this would be recognized by all.

And this brings us naturally to our second observation. Though they may not realize it, leaders in various spheres of life have been practically admitting for some time that the result of such policies as we have been discussing is that World War II has failed as utterly as World War I to accomplish the object for which so much blood has been shed, that the job will have to be done over again, and that we shall indeed have to live perpetually in mortal fear preparing for that eventuality. For example, Anthony Eden on November 15, 1944, told an English audience that the Big Three must stick together: "If we are not together, how long will it be before Germany tries to play off one against another or until we are menaced in another twenty years with a similar tyranny to the one which, we hope, will before long be overthrown?"

Why Peacetime Conscription?

When advocates of peacetime conscription in the United States are told that adoption of this measure would imply that we must prepare for a future war against our present allies, since Germany and Japan are going to be rendered powerless, they now answer: "Not at all. Unless the Big Powers stay together and are ready to use force on a large scale" (large enough to warrant universal military training here) "Germany and Japan may well raise their heads again soon and throw the world into fresh turmoil!" In other words, they too confess that the war will accomplish nothing and makes no sense whatever.

It is vitally important for Americans to understand that men in positions of power and influence are virtually telling us the war will not bring peace to the world and that we must assume the burden of *permanent preparedness for global, total war.* (And who, when he is honest with himself, does not realize that such "preparedness" does not prevent, but actually leads to war?) To emphasize this point we quote at some length from an article on universal peacetime military training by Harry L. Hopkins. It is obvious that his utterance at this time comes close to being an authoritative statement of administration policy. The article appeared in the March 1945 issue of the *American Magazine* under the title "Tomorrow's Army and Your Boy."

"We must accept a new and tough concept in world affairs—that the earth is not civilized enough to make world-wide disarmament practical for peace loving nations. . . . America's heart and mind will work intensively day and night to keep the world in peace. But that isn't enough. We can't take a chance. *When the war ends, we must immediately prepare to defend ourselves,* particularly to make sure that our enemies realize that if they dare strike again, they will lose again. I have no doubt that powerful forces in Germany and Japan are preparing even now for their next attempt to conquer us. *We will try to keep them impotent, but only a perpetual army of occupation would be able to prevent them from rearming eventually.* We don't know what new weapons will be developed. . . . We fought World War I, we thought, to end all wars. At the end of that war we wished fervently for peace, we did everything possible to prevent war—except prepare for it." (Italics mine—A. J. M.)

The war, then, will not put an end, as we were promised, to the German and Japanese "menace." At best, if we militarize the United States and turn the world into an armed camp, we shall have a few years' armistice. But this armistice will be highly precarious and it will lead straight to World War III because it is based on a military coalition of great nations pursuing their respective national interests, and it is notorious that there is no less dependable foundation than that for peace. And what shall we say about a "settlement" with Germany and Japan that will leave their peoples so wretched, hopeless, and resentful that it will not even give us a few years' armistice after we have totally disarmed them unless the United Nations of the World stand perpetual guard over them? If this is what the war has brought us to, who can any longer believe in war as a means for achieving any good?

II. Russia—A Menace?

Let us turn next to Russia's role in recent affairs. Not long ago the prevailing attitude in this country toward anything Russian was uncritically hostile. Any favorable mention of Russia or Bolshevism aroused a storm of unreasoning wrath. Now in a good many circles the same thing happens if anyone ventures to criticise Russia or Stalin. The critic is accused of fomenting war against Russia. Now I never thought that if you were opposed to war with Germany, for instance, you must condone Nazism or treat it lightly. The point was that war would promote, not prevent or destroy the evils of Nazism. In exactly the same way, opposition to war with Russia does not require soft-pedalling the dangers of Russian foreign policy or the evils of communism. Peace on earth will not result from appeasing these any more than from appeasing the Nazis. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that those who persist in being unrealistic about Russia's present course are contributing to the eventual development of a disillusionment and bitter anger in this country which will do great harm to labor and all progressive causes and furnish fuel for the madness that may carry us into war with Russia.

No one can deny any longer that in dealing with the

Polish question, for example, Russia has acted unilaterally, contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and in exactly the same high-handed fashion in which imperialist powers—and in particular the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese militarists—have dealt with such matters.

The *New York Times* in an editorial on December 19, 1944, in which it did all it could to justify or excuse the Russian course and plead that in no way must we offend our ally, yet had to conclude: "It must be admitted that this is not the way border problems were to be settled under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. . . . We invite the attention of the Russian government to the hazards of making decisions in a coalition war on the basis of unilateral action. This is isolationism. It encourages isolationism in others."

In order that we be aware of the nature of Stalinist methods and the meaning of the spread of Russian influence in Europe and Asia, let us go back and take a brief glance at the way in which Russia dealt in the early days of the war with the little Baltic countries, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. When for the "safety" of Russia they were first occupied by Russian military forces it was under a non-aggression pact to guarantee their security. The pact said: "This treaty shall in no way whatsoever affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, their forms of government, economic and social systems." But a little later they were given a nine-hour ultimatum, their governments were removed by a "plebiscite" conducted by the Red Army, and their territories were annexed to the Soviet Union. Raymond Daniel in the *New York Times*, May 5, 1943, quotes one participant in this plebiscite in one of these Baltic states as follows:

"My wife and I were awakened at 6:00 in the morning and escorted by an armed guard to the office. At the entrance each of us received a voting list which bore only one word, 'yes.' No other lists were given. Then each of us was ushered singly into a room where the balloting took place, always accompanied by an armed guard. The room was full of officials. When I approached the balloting box my paper was inspected by an official apparently to see if it was the right one. After I had dropped my paper I was conducted out of the room and told to go home. A few days later it was announced that the results of the plebiscite gave over 99% for the incorporation into the Soviet State."

Poland

It is conceivable that there are sections of Poland which might properly be incorporated in the Soviet Union and whose inhabitants would desire it. But again Russia is taking the matter into its own hands. Consider some of the methods used. A Free Polish Committee was set up in Moscow with which the Russian government dealt when it no longer recognized the Polish Government in exile in London, which for many months continued to be recognized by Great Britain and the United States. The head of the Free Polish Committee for some time was Wanda Vassilevska, Polish born but having renounced Polish and embraced Russian citizenship. She is the author of a novel *The Rainbow* which has been translated into English. She was married to Andre Korneichuk, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Russia. When Russia set up sixteen separate Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Korneichuk was promoted to be Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, nearest neighbor to Poland. Mrs. Korneichuk then signed an agreement with Mr. Korneichuk as to how much Polish territory should be ceded to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic!

There are other and more sordid happenings. Underground forces have been opposing the Germans in Poland as in other countries. Much is made in the Soviet press of the heroism and usefulness of these forces in other countries where the Communists though in a minority tend, as a result of close-knit organization and other factors, to dominate them. However, in Poland the Underground is or was under the direction of the Polish Government in London, which Moscow detests. Despite this fact, there is evidence that even Moscow encouraged the uprising of the Underground in Warsaw against the Germans last summer. At the time the Russians were almost at the gates of the Polish capital. But when one of the most heroic battles in the history of popular revolts had opened within the city, for some reason the Russian armies halted. Not only that but the Russians would not permit British planes that might have dropped food and weapons in Warsaw to land behind the Russian lines, and therefore no such aid could be sent. What the Russians would have said if General Eisenhower had not sent aid to the French Underground in Paris that same summer can easily be imagined. But the Russian press—of course government-controlled—actually denounced the uprising in Warsaw as a crime instigated by the London Poles. Tens of thousands of Poles were slaughtered under these conditions by the Germans who crushed the uprising. There are competent people, by no means Red-baiters or Fascists, who declare that it would be more accurate to say that they were slaughtered by *Stalin*, who wanted to get rid of Poles, especially the Socialists, who would not be subservient to Russia, and who consider Warsaw, therefore, as in the same class with Lidice. *The Tribune*, organ of the left Labor Party group in England, edited by Aneurin Bevan who has recently been elected a member of the Labor Party Executive said: "This is the first time that people who pose as champions of democracy have dared to describe as a crime a rising which, even according to their own statements, carried with it the whole people of Warsaw." The policy of Moscow in recognizing the Lublin Committee—successor to the Free Polish Committee—as the government of Poland is stigmatized by *The Tribune* as "the reduction of Poland to a vassal state." If any "happen to lead a heroic uprising that embarrasses the proteges of the great 'protecting' powers, they will be stigmatized as 'criminals' and threatened with punishment. . . . Please do not ask us to show enthusiasm for such policies."

Back Where We Started

In seeking to evaluate the significance of the treatment being accorded to Poland and the course pursued by Russia, several things must be borne in mind. There is much in the history of Poland since, let us say, 1918 which may be justly and severely criticised. In the matter of anti-Semitism her record between the two wars is particularly bad. But Germany's attempt unilaterally, or with Russian connivance, to impose a course upon Poland in violation of its sovereignty was the occasion of the present war. This high-handed method of settling disputes by violence, we were told, was outrageous and it was the duty of nations that

cared for peace to go to war against Germany in order once for all to put an end to this kind of procedure. But if now the war is to end by Russia using exactly the same method (of course with the same plea about "national safety" and "strategic frontiers") will not the present global blood-bath have been utterly in vain?

Furthermore, Poland fought valiantly against the Germans as long as it could, against a Hitler who was given a free hand against the Poles because the Western Powers were too far away to give prompt aid and because Stalin had made a peace pact with Hitler! The Polish Underground, as we have already cited, continued to fight persistently and without let-up. Poland was, from the standpoint of the Allies, a friendly power which had done just what it should have done all through these fateful years. *If dismemberment without previous consultation is to be the lot of such a nation, what can the little peoples—friendly and neutral—and the people of Axis lands expect from the United Nations, which on this showing certainly need no lessons in international gangsterism from the Nazis?*

The story of Poland does not end here. Moscow proposed and its puppet, the Lublin Polish Provisional Government, accepted the idea that this Polish government properly amenable to Moscow should be compensated for Polish territory and population taken away by Russia. Why it should be "compensated" if Russia is justified in her course, and is only taking Ukrainians who belong in Russia anyway, arouses some wonderment. But let us skip that. Moscow proposes to compensate a friendly Poland by slicing off parts of East Prussia and Silesia which would run perhaps to the Oder River and in which the Port of Stettin and such thoroughly German cities as Königsberg would be included. This would bring the Polish (Russian?) border to within sixty miles of Berlin! Millions of Germans under this plan would be deported from this region. Here is the inevitable basis for a German irredentist movement. Poland cannot possibly be strong enough to defend herself against a German nationalism which under these conditions will surely blaze forth at the earliest possible moment. In other words, this is another device for making sure that the Polish state is a puppet of Moscow and cannot possibly be anything else.

Edgar Ansel Mowrer, by no means anti-Russian, and an ardent supporter of the war, pointed out in the *New York Post,* January 9, 1945, that "the Polish group now unilaterally recognized by Moscow is the ninth of a series. The others are "the three Baltic States, the military administrations of Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. If this process continues unchecked, we must, therefore, expect to see the Soviet Union set up further stooges in four more countries, namely Austria, Slovakia, Iran, and (why not?) Manchuria."

Russia in the Balkans

In another column Mr. Mowrer called attention to some of the methods being employed by the Soviet regime in extending its sway over great sections of Europe. Bulgarian troops, for example, which have only recently ceased fighting against the United Nations, are being used by the Soviet authorities to "police" Serbian territories whose inhabitants have been 90 per cent on the side of the United Nations. Again, in Yugoslavia "Tito has organized national police on the Soviet model, granted no freedom of the press, expelled American newspaper correspondents for allegedly 'unfriendly' reporting, discriminated against British and American officers in uniform. In other words, these regimes are 'democratic' in the sense of *Pravda,* not in that of Thomas Jefferson."

Two observations should be made before we attempt a judgment on what the expansion of Soviet power means for the future. In the first place, we have been saying that Russia has been pursuing its "national interests," playing the game of power politics and imperialistic expansionism in a determined, autocratic, and often brutal fashion. We do not believe that Russia alone is guilty of this charge. We shall indicate in a moment that it applies also to Great Britain and the United States.

Russia's Advantage

In the second place, at one very important point Soviet Russia and the Communists are gaining influence and will probably continue to do so, because they are more nearly satisfying the needs of the masses and the requirements of the future than Great Britain and the United States. The latter are nearly everywhere trying, so far as possible, to maintain the pre-war economic and social system and are supporting the elements which controlled and benefitted from that system. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, is offering a change. It seeks to eliminate the old ruling groups, in particular the land-owning elements. Thus it offers hope to multitudes in Europe. These masses are not attracted to individualistic or monopolistic (cartel) capitalism. The evils which afflicted them under the old regimes before the war were so great that they are determined to fly from them, even though other evils that they know not of may be in store for them.

Many sincere and thoughtful people therefore conclude that Russia is indeed the hope of Europe's masses and that we should welcome and in the main collaborate with Russia in extending her sway. Sometimes in their eagerness to maintain the military alliance with Russia they even argue that Russia is becoming conservative, respectable, "capitalistic" and "religious," in other words "just like Britain and the United States." This obviously contradicts the first position that Russia is entitled to extend her sway because she is establishing a new order.

What is most important about Russia and significant for good or ill, lies in what is new and distinctive about its philosophy and program. I am persuaded that fundamentally this philosophy and program are a menace to mankind and that it is a vast tragedy that a war ostensibly waged to prevent the domination of Europe, and perhaps the world, by Nazism should be about to result in the domination of vast territories and great populations by Stalinist Communism.

The economic system existing in Russia today is not communism according to Marx or Lenin, nor is it socialism. There are, for example, immense spreads, fully as great as may be encountered in plutocratic United States, between the wages of ordinary farmers or workers and the income of managers in industry or political leaders. "Salaries are paid in the Soviet Union which are 100 times higher than the average and 300 times higher than the minimal wage." The workers are in many respects in a state of slavery. Every citizen must have a domestic pass (since 1932). He cannot leave his place of residence for more than 24 hours

without having his pass inspected by the police. One cannot live in a big city or within a radius of 50-100 kilometers of it without special permission. Leaving a job without permission carries a penalty of two months in jail. For temporary absence or for tardiness the penalty is forced labor up to six months at a 25 per cent cut in wages. Except for bureaucrats on official missions, almost no Soviet citizens have been permitted to travel abroad in the past 15 years or more. From 800,000 to 1,000,000 young boys are conscripted annually for labor service. After a training lasting from six months to two years they are obliged to work four years wherever they may be sent, and even after that time they cannot leave their work-place without official permission. This is not communism or socialism; it is state collectivism—totalitarianism.

Soviet Democracy?

There is no democracy, political or any other kind, under this system. Recall that on August 21, 1939, 180 million Soviet subjects were unanimously and enthusiastically in favor of "collective security" and a "democratic" war against Germany and two days later they were just as unanimously and enthusiastically in favor of the Hitler-Stalin pact and against "the English and French imperialist war." Not a single voice was raised—publicly—in opposition or even doubt. Unanimity is secured by the Communist Party, the only party permitted to exist, and by the ever-present secret police. This does not mean, as some believe, that there is actual, spontaneous approval and no dissatisfaction. If that were the case the secret police could, of course, be dispensed with, Russians would be permitted to travel abroad, and foreigners in Russia would be permitted really to mingle with the people. Those who are interested in details on these matters may find them in the recently published *The Real Soviet Russia,* by Professor David J. Dallin of Yale University.

Terrorism is still used within Russia and outside, as we have already indicated. The Communists have never repudiated that method, which for the most part Fascists and Nazis first learned from them.

The philosophy of communism is materialistic and incompatible with many essentials of the Jewish-Christian world-view. Recent easing up of restrictions on the churches must not mislead us. As Prof. Dallin points out: "Separation of church and state has no basis in fact under a political regime such as exists in Russia.... The restoration of churches without the help of the state's economic organs is impossible.... The printing of books and magazines in Russia requires... the active collaboration of various government agencies.... Living by the grace of the government, the church... is compelled to co-operate fully with the government politically."

Incidentally, how can a government which is subject to no democratic checks from within be relied upon to collaborate sincerely in any world organization?

It is true that the Stalin regime is using nationalist-Russian appeals in rallying the masses for war purposes, and during the early months of the Hitler attack and the Russian retreat, when the Party was unpopular among the masses, little use was made of the old Marxist slogans. But this does not mean as many believe (or pretend to believe) that the determination to achieve world-revolution has been abandoned. On the contrary, the Russian press recently recalled Stalin's words: *"The Red Army is* the army of the emancipated workers and peasants, *the army of the November revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat."* The victories in the war are now credited to the work of the Bolshevik Party and to the fact that Russia has a "socialist order." And "if Russia is victorious because of its socialist order, it follows that this order would also be best for any other country. The objective of the war must be the establishment of such an order throughout the world." The only thing that is forbidden in Russia is to speak *openly* of social revolution in other countries. Let those who question this analysis ask themselves why Communist parties, though in certain cases under faked names, are maintained in every country, how they come to follow meticulously all the twists in Soviet policy, and consider carefully what is the effect of the activity of these parties and of the Communist-dominated guerilla troops throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

I maintain, therefore, that continuing the war along present lines, and thus spreading disintegration throughout Europe, makes for the extension of Stalinist communism. This is what American boys are dying for as the war is prolonged. It is unfortunate that reactionaries may make use of this fact for their own purposes. I do not for a moment believe that war against Russia would be anything but evil and disastrous. But what the war is doing to foster Russian expansionism and Stalinist penetration in the United States and elsewhere is, I believe, a tragic and ominous fact that must be faced.

III. Britain, Empire, and Democracy

Let us turn for a moment to the role played by Great Britain in recent months. If we do not devote as much space to it as we have to Russia, it is only because most Americans are pretty well aware of the dangers to the peace which are involved in the imperialist course being followed by Britain under Churchill's leadership. Mr. Churchill's dictum that he does not propose to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire still stands. That rules out genuine independence for India. It explains why Nehru and practically all the leaders of the India National Congress are still in jail. It explains why there has been no indication, in spite of China's long agony in the war, that Hongkong is to be relinquished by Great Britain. It means the restoration of Singapore as a British base with the help of American ships, at the price of American lives. What kind of peace can be built on this foundation of empire?

Because the Empire must be maintained, Mr. Churchill led the way in the shameless emasculation of the Atlantic Charter. It does not apply, according to his exegesis, to India, and it does not apply to the Axis countries. Take from the jurisdiction of the Atlantic Charter everything that has to do, directly or indirectly, with the Axis countries and their satellites and then everything that one of the Great Powers, Russia, Britain, France, the United States, considers "necessary for its strategic safety," or a "domestic" concern (e.g., the Monroe Doctrine in the case of the United States) and not much is left. Yet it was allegedly the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter which justified American participation in the war and the sacrifice of American lives in every region of the earth!

British insistence on tight control over any country where British imperial interests are at stake, in the estimation of

the British cabinet, including its Labor Party ministers, is as intransigent as Russia's. The refusal to permit Count Sforza to hold the post of Foreign Secretary in the Bonomi cabinet in Italy is a case in point. Consistently British policy has worked to maintain the House of Savoy on the throne in Italy, contrary to the clearly expressed opinion of the democratic forces in that country. Every effort is made to keep Italy a puppet of Britain, as Poland and other countries are made puppets to Russia. Late in 1944 the British called upon the Underground forces in northern Italy to cease activities against the Germans and to return to their homes in that region still occupied by German troops. That is to say, these men were given the choice of taking to the hills and trying to keep up the fight against German troops in bitter winter weather and without Allied support, or returning to their homes as marked men to be massacred by the Germans and by the pro-Mussolini Italian elements in their home towns and villages. One is reminded of the way in which Stalin dealt with the Polish Underground in Warsaw. *British policy comes pretty close to the same cold-blooded liquidation of men fighting in the Allied cause because they want their own homeland to be free and do not want to exchange a German for a British overlordship.*

Because Italians protested against these insulting and high-handed measures and also complained of the starvation and near-starvation in the parts of Italy which had been "liberated" by the "democratic" nations, Mr. Churchill had the effrontery to say in a speech in the House of Commons in January that "so far as Italy is concerned, there are moments when one has almost wondered whether it was they who had unconditionally surrendered to us, or we who unconditionally surrendered to them."

The *New Republic,* strong supporter of the war, and of President Roosevelt as the indispensable man, had this to say on January 22, 1945, of Allied policy in Italy:

"Italy's grim post-Fascist experience, it cannot be emphasized often enough, is not the result of so-called 'mistakes' in Allied policy. It is the result of a deliberate policy, determined by Great Britain's imperialist interests. The object of this policy is to prevent a strong, democratic Italy. It has been charged on a number of occasions that the British, in order to starve the Italian people into submission first and then to ask for Italian 'gratitude' after giving minimum relief, have artificially obstructed recovery of industrial and agricultural production in the liberated areas. ... The only purpose of the war against Italy, it now seems, was the destruction of Italy's war machine and the liquidation of the most notorious Fascist leaders. If Italy had been able to stay out of the war against the Allies, Mussolini, like Franco, would still be in the saddle."

Turmoil in Greece

Greece is another country which, in the deal between Churchill and Stalin at Teheran, was recognized as in the British "sphere of influence." Here again a persistent effort has been made by the British to bolster up the monarchy and to scatter its opponents. In the background are heavy British investments in Greece, as well as the strategic importance of the country as part of the Mediterranean "lifeline of the Empire." Popular forces might not be as much concerned about the investments as the King, of German ancestry, who owes his position entirely to British support.

Here again there is much to support the theory that British military and diplomatic representatives deliberately staged a crisis which resulted in a massacre of women and children participating in a demonstration in Athens early in December, 1944, and in a bitter war which British soldiers waged, with apparently no native support, against the Greek ELAS forces; or at least that British policy produced events such as this as its inevitable fruit.

It seems quite clear, by the way, that the ELAS forces are strongly under Communist influence and have on their part no scruples against dirty fighting. As pacifists we are in no sense approving or condoning the violence and terrorism to which the liberation forces in various countries resort. *But we are concerned to point out, especially to the active and passive supporters of the war, the irrational, immoral, and tragic aspect it has assumed, as the Allied armies fight the very democratic forces of resistance which Allied political leaders had for years summoned to aid them in opposing the Germans.* These resistance forces are now discovering that the Allies do not intend, any more than the Germans, to leave the peoples of the little nations free to determine their own destiny.

The fact that in Greece the resistance forces are Communist dominated provides us with a specially illuminating lesson in how Russian and British imperialism behave when they get within range of each other. In his December and January speeches in the House of Commons Churchill employed the full resources of his vituperative rhetoric on the Greek left-wing partisans. Their democracy he characterized as a "swindle-democracy." They were "bands of gangsters ... forcing their way into Greek cities ... and endeavoring to introduce a totalitarian regime.... Democracy is not a harlot to be picked up in the street by a man with a Tommy-gun." But in the same speeches, to quote *The Nation,* he "had nothing but honeyed words for Tito and his followers (in Yugo-Slavia) who, to most observers, seem to be men of much the same kind and with much the same ideas," and who had used the same methods in gaining the ascendancy over the Yugo-Slav government-in-exile in London, which Mr. Churchill and his Labor Party colleagues in the British cabinet supported as allies in the war for democracy and against dictatorship. That is, they supported this government-in-exile until Stalin put his foot down and it was agreed that Yugo-Slavia was not in the British but in the Russian "sphere of influence."

On the other hand, what does Stalin who so vigorously supported Tito and his Communist-dominated partisans in Yugo-Slavia, do about the British war on the Communist-dominated partisans in Greece? The answer is, "Nothing. Hands Off!" The reason may be that the Greek Communists are too independent, not sufficiently strict followers of the Moscow "party line." Mr. Churchill called them "Trotzkyists" in his January speech. Perhaps this is how Stalin regards them; or it may be that pinning this label on them just made it easier for Stalin to face possible protests in Russia against inaction while good "comrades" were being slain by British "imperialists." More likely is the explanation that under the Teheran deal Greece is in the British sphere and, for the present at least, Stalin is sticking to his bargain with Churchill. He may surmise that if he "sits tight," the Churchillian policy will presently drive the Greeks away from a British into a Russian orientation.

In western Europe "British policy is to create a western

bloc, with a demarcation line between its interests and those of the Soviets, and through this to solidify, under British leadership, the colonial world. The colonies of the world almost without exception belong to Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Italy." Again, the familiar power-politics pattern. France, weakened by the war and in need of security at all costs against an attack from a renascent Germany, was counted on to fit in with this program as a respectful and grateful junior partner. But, unbelievable as it may seem, the French experience has not resulted in the abandonment of nationalism, imperialism, and power politics by the DeGaulle government. There has been not the slightest suggestion, for example, that French Indo-China should be liberated or the French Empire in Africa surrendered, though at a time when France had almost ceased to exist, control over Syria was renounced as a war propaganda measure. The DeGaulle government does not wish to play second fiddle in the British orchestra and it considerably damaged British prestige a couple of months ago by going to Moscow rather than to London first and renewing in effect the old Stalin-Laval pact. Under that agreement Russia and France unite to keep Germany down. France supports Russian interests in Eastern Europe and Russia recognizes and backs "the strategic needs" of France in the west, including presumably some formula for French domination of the Rhine Valley. It is noteworthy that although the twenty-year British-Russian pact made some provision for adjustment into a possible world organization such as the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, there was pointedly no such provision in the French-Russian pact.

IV. The Case of Japan

In the space at our disposal it is impossible to touch on significant recent developments and problems in all parts of the world but before we proceed to an analysis of Dumbarton Oaks and Crimea and an outline of our own program, a word must be said about Japan and certain aspects of United States foreign policy.

As for the first, we are fortunate in having a recent statement regarding Japan by a number of men and women who have seen missionary service in China, the Philippines, India, Korea, and Japan itself, including such distinguished figures as E. Stanley Jones, the church historian Kenneth Scott Latourette, Frank C. Laubach, Dr. Ida Scudder, and Charles W. Iglehart. At several points in the following paragraphs I paraphrase, or quote directly, that notable utterance.

The proposals widely made for the post-war treatment of Japan are similar to those made for Germany. They are coercive, destructive, and punitive. They seem to call for a ruthless destruction of life and property until unconditional surrender is followed by a military occupation. The United Nations are then to enforce a reconstruction of the internal life of the Japanese people, politically, economically, industrially, and in spiritual outlook. Japan is to be demoted from the rank of the first technologically developed nation of Asia to that of a third-rate agricultural people.

But the Japanese people have qualities of character and leadership that are needed in the reconstruction of the life of Asia. For decades Japan played a worthy role in the modernization of the East, and she may do so again. She was caught and enmeshed in the same pagan view of life and swept by the same forces of economic expansion that have played upon the other modern nations; the only difference is that the credulity and loyalty of her people were more ruthlessly exploited by her military masters, and her cycle of exploitation, empire, and war has been even more swift and extreme.

A plan like the above for the elimination of Japan as a threat in the post-war world is, under the circumstances, not only futile and impossible of enforcement, but it is open to ethical question throughout. It has slight chance of eliciting from the Japanese people the voluntary cooperation without which they cannot be restored to national health and without which peace in the Far East will be extremely precarious.

With an international order that would impartially safeguard the welfare of all the peoples of Asia, this drastic surgery of Japanese nationhood would be unnecessary. Her domestic reconstruction could begin immediately upon the cessation of war, and it could be carried out largely by herself. Nor is it likely that she ever again would become a threat to the security of her neighbors. Any international body competent to maintain its authority over the great Western Powers in Asia could readily check any possible act of lawlessness on the part of Japan. Furthermore, with tribunals handling disputes and providing for peaceful change, the chief incentives to war will be removed and the people of Japan may be expected to return to normal patterns of behavior.

In this connection we must not lose sight of the fact that it is these Western Powers which set the example of large-scale and often utterly brutal aggression in the Orient. They have given some indications of being willing to modify their administration but not of being prepared to "liquidate empire" and relinquish control in the Pacific area. Indeed, if the war ends with Japan emasculated and China, as seems likely, divided and weak, Western control may well be more decisive and overwhelming than ever. In that case the Pacific area is likely to become the world's cockpit of empire. The relations between the white and colored races would be greatly embittered. Imagination fails in contemplation of the explosive possibilities of the Pacific Basin if we renounce the attempt to create a new order of life for its people and drift on our way of power-struggle to disaster. There is no time to be lost in setting in motion forces for the creation of a cooperative community of nations and peoples in Asia and the world.

V. United States' Idealism

In many circles, and not least among churchmen, it is customary to speak of the United States and its government as pursuing in the midst of this morass of power politics and imperialism an idealistic course. President Roosevelt in his address to Congress on the state of the nation in January even borrowed from the Niebuhrians the idea that we were in danger of yielding to "perfectionism."

The great problem before us, according to this analysis, is how we can prevent the American government and people from running away from "the European mess," how we can persuade them to compromise their extreme idealism a bit and "realistically" accept a small beginning in the direction of world-organization. If one takes into account the thoughts and hopes of millions of plain people in this country there is some justification for this view, but as a

statement of the actual character and effect of U. S. foreign policy it is fantastic. Mr. Stalin and Mr. Churchill operate on the assumption that the United States, like their countries, is acting in its own national interest and is pursuing an imperialist course; and whatever else may be said about these men, they are "realists" who act on facts and not conjectures in this realm of world politics.

Mr. Roosevelt's jocular story about how the Atlantic Charter was not a binding instrument, not law, and had been just scribbled down on a piece of paper which was passed back and forth between Mr. Churchill and himself one time when they were at sea—perhaps in more senses than one—was an unintentional revelation of an attitude which has contributed, as have the actions of other powers, to the deterioration of international relations. The subsequent explanation that the Charter does stand as an ideal or goal, which of course cannot be reached at a single bound, did not greatly help the situation. For what were the provisions of the Atlantic Charter? They included the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement; no territorial changes except in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned; the rights of all peoples to choose their own form of government; equal access by all nations to trade and raw materials; collaboration to improve economic conditions; security for "all the men in all the lands"; freedom of ocean travel; disarmament of aggressor nations and encouragement for "all other practicable measures" to bring about disarmament of all nations. Surely *The Christian Century* is correct in pointing out that these were not the expression of vague aspirations, counsels of perfection, and in charging that "the one thing that now makes the Atlantic Charter such a stumbling-block to men like Churchill and Roosevelt is that its principles were so practicable and clearly stated."

We have our own "sphere of influence" policy, have had for a long time in the Monroe Doctrine, and are extending the area in which we would no more countenance a possible threat to our military or commercial position than would Britain or Russia to theirs in other sections of the globe. In our dealings with Darlan and Franco and our complicity in the war with Britain and Russia we are guilty of appeasing anti-democratic elements. Dorothy Thompson aptly summed up our policy, and the bearing of certain developments upon it, in a column last December: "American policy is to make a security belt in the Western Hemisphere, to leave the question of disinterestedness in Soviet and British spheres open, and plan for a vast postwar export expansion. The reorganization of the State Department has this in mind. In this latter ambition, collision is more likely with Britain than with the Soviet."

That ardent pro-war columnist, Samuel Grafton, pointed out in a column at about the same time the significance of some of our slogans at the International Air Conference, Bretton Woods, and similar gatherings. "By freedom we mean sincerely freedom of self-rule for liberated peoples, but we also mean freedom to land our commercial airplanes wherever we like . . . freedom to scramble for the carrying trade of the world. . . . We showed at the Chicago Air Conference that we mean to give the British no quarter. . . . The content of the near-crisis between Britain and America is Britain's fear of unchecked economic rivalry and our desire for it. Our position regarding the peoples of Italy, Belgium, and Greece is superior to the British. But it is also true that we can afford to have it so." This American policy means economic strangulation of the British people. It is selfish, imperialistic, and calculated to sow the seeds of another war.

It is against this background that we must evaluate Dumbarton Oaks which, we are told, is the one barrier between us and chaos and another world war—not a very substantial one, but the best we have or can get.

VI. Dumbarton Oaks and the Churchmen

The purpose of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to lay the foundation of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security was praiseworthy. We may rejoice that even during the war an effort was made, albeit a stumbling one and not unmixed with hyprocrisy, to effectuate this purpose. In the Dumbarton proposals for an Economic and Social Council there are excellent features. The heart of Dumbarton Oaks, however, is the Security Council. Around it the real debate revolves. And by it Dumbarton Oaks should stand or fall in the thinking of people of goodwill.

The Security Council is to be charged with keeping the peace among the nations. The Council will have eleven members. Of these, five representing the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and in due course France —the big powers—will hold permanent seats. Since there will be an overwhelming preponderance of military might in the hands of the first three of these nations, they will dominate the proposed "international organization." Practically every measure that could be conceived of to limit the power of the General Assembly, in which all "peace loving nations" are to have membership on a basis of "sovereign equality" (which is far from being the same as actual equality) is included in the Dumbarton draft. At that, a tremendous range of action is put outside the jurisdiction even of the Security Council which the Big Three firmly control, and in these areas each power is free to do as it pleases.

Consider carefully some of these stipulations. The admission of new members, suspension of members, the election of the Secretary-General, the investigation of "any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," the imposition of economic sanctions, summoning contingents of armed forces of member nations and controlling their military operations—all these and many other crucial matters cannot be decided on without the approval of the *Security Council.* Moreover, if the General International Organization as outlined at Dumbarton Oaks should be established, there would be but a very small chance of securing important amendments in the constitution later. No amendment can come into force until all the powers having permanent membership on the *Security Council* have ratified such amendment and it has also been ratified by a majority of the other members of the Organization "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

To a Military Staff Committee, consisting of "the *Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council,*" (i.e. the heavily armed, dominant powers) is entrusted the task of advising the Security Council on "regulation of armaments" and "possible disarmament." Excluded from the jurisdiction even of the Security Council are all "situations or disputes arising out of matters which by inter-

national law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned," i.e., anything having to do with the American Monroe Doctrine, British dealings with India, colonial questions, tariffs, immigration. The International Organization, according to Section XII, 2, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, is also forbidden to interfere with any action the victor nations may take "in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war."

Are the Great Powers Curbed?

The contention of some that the power of the great armed nations is in Dumbarton Oaks subjected to some international control cannot, in our view, be substantiated. The point is so fundamental and critical and there is so much confusion about it in the minds of churchmen and others that we wish to devote some space to a consideration of the report of Commission II of the National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace held at Cleveland in January, 1945. Commission II (Prof. Wm. E. Hocking, chairman) was charged with preparing for the use of the Conference an evaluation of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and dealt at length with problems of "power" and the limitation of power. It pointed to the fact that power is at present centralized in three or four great states. What is to be done about this? Well, the Commission replies, if centralized power is to "be made to serve the ends of justice" it must be "by subjecting it to a greater force." (For ourselves we do not accept the proposition that peace can thus be built on force, but it is the view generally accepted, and certainly it is the assumption underlying the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and much of the thinking of the majority of the churchmen who met at Cleveland.) Does Dumbarton Oaks then provide for this "greater force" to hold the big powers in check? Quite the contrary, the Commission is forced to reply. Read these lines carefully. "If any one of the great powers were to be condemned by the others and the force of the organization were brought to bear, *this would be tantamount to the inauguration of another world war.* Whatever the force at the disposal of the Security Council, it cannot be great enough to be decisive in such an emergency." (Is there *any* force that could be placed at the disposal of *any* world organization, the employment of which against one of the really big powers would not mean world war? And does this consideration not serve to kick the bottom out from under the whole idea of "collective security" by force, whether in the form of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals or any other?)

By what reasoning, then, did the churchmen on Commission II come to the conclusion that Dumbarton Oaks is an important step toward genuine world organization, toward control over the power of the big nations and security, rather than a very thin, transparent veil behind which a set-up based on power politics is to be sold to peoples desperately eager for a secure peace? For one thing, the report contended that the action of the great powers in setting up something that looks like, or possibly aspires to be or might become, a functioning security organization "is *prima facie* evidence of a desire on the part of" these powers "to move, albeit cautiously," beyond a power alliance.

On what did Commission II base this assertion? At this point, its report resorts to a flight of fancy which is astonishing in men who are constantly insisting that we must stop being idealists and dreamers and become "realistic," and to an exhibition of illogical reasoning which is equally astonishing. It says that we have to assume "a degree of good will and good faith on the part of the great powers. . . . *The good faith of statesmen with each other and with their publics is presupposed in any approval offered by us to these Proposals.*"

The Role of Faith

The first observation to be made about this argument is that the "realists" who so often rebuke pacifists for calling for reliance on good will and good faith on the part of human beings must in the final analysis confess that this good will and good faith are all they have to rely on. Nevertheless, sincerely believing that the capacity to act in good will and good faith exists in men, and arranging your program and your appeals as churchmen in such a way as to call upon men to exercise these qualities, does not mean that it is not exceedingly important in a given instance to determine whether national leaders, for example, are acting in good faith rather than by their actions belying their professions. If they are doing the latter the proper course for churchmen is not to say: "Though you are actually setting up nothing but a camouflaged military alliance, we believe you are doing something else." Rather it is to say: "This house built on sand will fall. Believing in your capacity for good will, we ask you to call that good will into action to overcome the fears and the selfish urges which have caused you to make this mistake. We call upon you to stop moving in the wrong direction and to take a step, albeit a small one, in the right."

Obviously, then, we are confronted with a question of fact: Do the deeds of the governments of the big powers give reasonable ground for the assertion that they wish to set up a true world organization instead of a military alliance? It is, the Commission rightly emphasized, "*a question of fact, momentous for the world.*" It is hard to believe, but the Commission report actually answered that crucial question thus: "*It is not within the province nor the competence of this Commission to offer a verdict on this question of fact!*" In other words, it seems to us that this report says in effect: "We urge the churches to support Dumbarton Oaks, though it certainly does not look like anything but a camouflage for a military alliance. We think it is, nevertheless, an evidence of the fact that the big powers 'intend to move, albeit cautiously, beyond that position.' How do we know this to be a fact? We do not know, we have not the means of knowing, and it is not our business to know."

It is with regret that one writes these things—a regret that is the greater because the spirit of the Cleveland Conference was so truly Christian and its pronouncements on other crucial points such as the treatment of Germany and Japan and against Jim Crow were so intelligent and powerful.

It is patent that the reason for the twisting and turning, the confusion and fumbling, of good men when it comes to the Dumbarton Oaks issue is fear, certain and prolific breeder of all sorts of evil. Commission II said: "We are prompted to our support by a consideration of what the alternative to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals may be. We feel that if these Proposals are rejected no

world order and security organization of any kind will be possible for a long time to come."

This may be true. Great optimism about the immediate future of the world is not warranted. But if in his anxiety to escape falling into a horrible morass on one side of the road, a man takes a course which lands him in the equally hopeless morass on the other, he is still lost. When it is setting forth the facts about Dumbarton Oaks and the international situation, and not expressing pious hopes, Commission II in effect says that under Dumbarton Oaks "no world order and security organization" is possible either. To say that our choice is "Dumbarton Oaks or Chaos" is to be indeed arch-pessimists, for it is the same as saying our choice is "Chaos or Chaos."

The Cleveland Amendments

In the light of these considerations the final action of the Cleveland Conference and the results which may flow from it are of the utmost importance. It is gratifying to be able to report that the discussion of the crucial Dumbarton Oaks issue was as thorough-going as is possible in such a conference and that the conclusion was far from an enthusiastic or unqualified endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Conference came as near as it could to saying to the American government: "We will *not* urge the Churches to support Dumbarton Oaks *unless* drastic amendments are made in the plan *and* changes are effected in the actual course now being pursued by the great powers"—without quite taking that clean-cut position which in our opinion would have been sound from the standpoint of Christian standards and would have put the churches in a position to exercise a great, perhaps a decisive influence on international affairs at a supreme crisis.

The crucial pronouncement of the Cleveland Conference is this sentence: "We recommend that the churches support the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as an important step in the direction of world co-operation *but* because we do not approve of them in their entirety as they now stand, we urge the following measures for their improvement."

The proposed amendments if adopted would alter Dumbarton Oaks beyond recognition! They might much more accurately be described as embodying a substitute motion. This is certainly decidedly to the good. The changes, in summary form, are:

(1) *A Preamble*—to state the purposes of justice set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

(2) *Development of International Law*—to bring the actions of the world organization under law.

(3) *Voting Power*—to prevent a nation from voting if and when its case is being judged according to predetermined international law.

(4) *Colonial and Dependent Areas*—to establish a Commission to promote the well-being of colonies with the goal of their independence in view.

(5) *Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*—to establish a Commission to promote human rights.

(6) *Universal Membership*—to admit all nations willing to accept the obligations of membership.

(7) *Limitation of Armaments*—to speed the reduction of armaments.

(8) *Smaller Powers*—to protect more fully the rights of smaller nations.

(9) *Amendment*—to make it possible to amend the Charter without the consent of all the permament members.

The temper of the Conference was put to the test at another point when it went on record as urging "a meeting of the United Nations, at the earliest possible moment, to consider the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals." A proposal which would in effect have put the Conference on record as urging the churches to support the proposals which would be laid before this conference of the United Nations was overwhelmingly rejected on the ground that we did not know what these proposals might be and therefore endorsing them now would be issuing a blank check.

There are differences of opinion as to where the Cleveland Conference leaves us. Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam could say in the closing address that it had pledged "unconditional support" of Dumbarton Oaks; and the present writer is of the opinion that, with whatever misgivings, this is what the great majority at Cleveland wanted to do. But these misgivings were many and grave and it seemed clear that the majority also believed that the actual course followed by the great powers before the next international conference to deal with Dumbarton Oaks must be carefully scrutinized and that conditions might well develop which would give churchmen and others no alternative but to withdraw support. The Crimea meeting of the Big Three which has now set the date for this Conference in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, made important revelations as to the war and peace policy of the powers, including explicit references to Dumbarton Oaks. It is imperative, therefore, to review the whole situation in the light of the Report of the Crimea Conference.

VII. The Meaning of Crimea

The fact that this long awaited meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin was finally held and that it resulted in an agreement among them on a number of points and an announcement that they expect to continue to co-operate for an indefinite period probably means that the deep-seated differences among the great powers will not be permitted to break out immediately into open warfare. An effort to stablize the relations between them and jointly to impose a "peace" on Europe and Asia will probably be made.

The Report of the Crimea Conference issued on February 12, 1945, ends indeed with a sweeping assertion which appears to have been made in a spirit of complete self-assurance by the Big Three. "Victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions" of a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." That covers a lot of ground. The fact, if it be a fact, that three men had it in their power to make decisions of such stupendous magnitude may itself perhaps give us pause. Perhaps to some extent the key to the significance of these decisions and to future developments is furnished by this concentration of power in the hands of three mortal men. However that may be, what do the contents of this

Report reveal about the war, the peace, and the post-war world?

In the first place, the attitude toward Germany remains "tough"; the peace is, for the German people, to be definitely punitive. Not only are "German militarism and nazism" to be destroyed but the Big Three intend to "eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for war production." That certainly leaves out nothing of significance. Germany is, moreover, to compensate for war damage "in kind to the greatest extent possible." This leaves the way open for the use of German labor battalions by Russia, with no commitment as to the conditions under which such forced labor shall toil or the limits to be set for "damage" and "compensation." President Roosevelt in a recent press conference indicated his support of this dangerous and peculiarly objectionable form of "reparations." Ominous in the light of what we have said earlier about the role of Russia and the character of its regime is the concluding sentence in this section relating to a commission which is to determine these matters: "The commission will work in Moscow."

"Unconditional surrender" is unqualifiedly reaffirmed as is the policy that the terms implied "will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished"—a policy which many non-pacifists as well as pacifists regard as stupid and responsible for unnecessarily prolonging the war at the cost of the lives of many Allied soldiers. It opens the way, moreover, for copying the bad example set in connection with the Italian surrender, which took place in the summer of 1943, but the terms of which are still at this writing kept secret from the Italian and all other peoples and even from the United States Congress.

The three powers "will each occupy a separate zone of Germany" and France will be invited to "take over a zone of occupation." It is, however, provided that there shall be "a central control commission of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin" to co-ordinate administration and control. The decisive facts here are that the military will be in the saddle and that troops of four powers will dominate in separate sections of Germany. This, as well as the Polish "settlement" to which we shall refer in a moment, points to dismemberment a la the Morgenthau plan or a similar scheme. Just what "co-ordination" will mean in the long run is not clear. Possibly the provision for joint control by the military chiefs sitting in Berlin rules out for the present the setting up of a Russian puppet government anywhere in Germany under General von Paulus, a move which has been widely discussed. This is not certain, however. The possibility of control of Germany, or of large portions of it, by a puppet regime composed of what can only be described as a sinister combination of Communist Party and German generals, including Gestapo commanders, remains. In such matters the size of the respective occupying forces and the willingness of governments to employ them is always finally decisive. Stalin will certainly not be at a disadvantage, under the circumstances, in decisions affecting the future of Germany and thus of Europe.

Partition of Poland

In the section of the Report on Poland there is a formula by which Churchill and Roosevelt, who had recognized the Polish Government in Exile in London and had refused to date to recognize the Moscow-created Lublin Provisional Government of Poland, "save face," while Stalin loses nothing. The Lublin government is designated as "the present Provisional Government"! It it thus recognized as the *de facto* government of Poland and by the same token Great Britain and the United States, by slippery maneuvering, withdraw recognition from the Government in exile in London which they had supported for years and egged on to keep up the fight against Germany. The Lublin regime is to be "reorganized on a broarder democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." This new government is then to be called "the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity" and all the allied powers will enter into diplomatic relations with it.

There is a provision in this section on Poland, and a similar one in the Crimea "Declaration on Liberated Europe," which is generally hailed as demonstrating the good democratic intentions of the Big Three. It is that "This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal-suffrage and secret ballot." In the meantime "the present puppet government," as the *New York Times* describes it, is in the saddle. It has systematically crushed all articulate sentiment in favor of the Polish Government in London. The Polish Underground reports hundreds of cases of "wholesale arrests, deportations, in some cases executions" of men who refuse to accept the authority of the puppet government and even of elements now willing to accept it who were critical in the past. As William Henry Chamberlain has pointed out, if the Yalta Declaration on this matter is to be regarded as having any reality certain "conditions must be realized as an indispensable prelude to an honest election" such as immediate substitution of an interim government, release of political prisoners and return of deportees, and freedom of the press and political organization. Obviously the national leaders who put the stamp of approval on Russia's unilateral action in carving up Poland and on Russia's puppet government intend to guarantee nothing of the sort.

The unilateral action of Russia in annexing eastern Poland is, as we have just indicated, confirmed and given status, and the stamp of approval is put upon the policy of carving up Germany, and other countries if the strategic or other supposed needs of big powers so dictate, by the declaration that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west." Just like that! This can only mean territory which has never from an ethnical or historical viewpoint been Polish.

Since very strenuous efforts are being made to gloss over the sinister character of the "compromise" relative to Poland to which Roosevelt and Churchill agreed, we venture to present a couple of samples of documentation bearing on this case.

The Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941, reads: "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." The British Foreign Office on the same day quoted an official note from Eden to Sikorski: "I desire to assure you that his Majesty's Government do not recognize territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August

1939." The British communique went on to quote a note from General Sikorski to Eden: "This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government, which . . . have never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war."

As for soothing British and American sensibilities by basing the partition of Poland on the "Curzon Line," which in any case is an obvious departure from the documents just quoted, I believe the records will show that with the exception of a small section around Bialystok the line now determined by the Big Three is the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939! Before that it was the line arrived at when Catherine of Russia divided Poland with Frederick of Prussia.

Furthermore, the Curzon Line did not include any of that part of Poland which was known as Eastern Galicia, which had belonged to Austria-Hungary, never had belonged to Russia until Molotov-Ribbentrop performed their operation, and for more than 600 years had been part of Poland.

The reference to Bialystok a moment ago brings to mind another vivid illustration of the hypocrisy and cynicism which characterizes the action of the Big Three in dealing with plebiscites and "free elections" and which will serve to remind us how utterly impossible it is under existing circumstances to have a free election in Poland. The basis for Russia's claim to eastern Poland is, largely, that the people of this region voted overwhelmingly in a post-1939 plebiscite for incorporation in the Soviet Union, and also that "ethnically" the population is Russian and not Polish. Well, the Bialystok region has an "ethnic" majority of white Russians and Jews and voted "99 per cent" for incorporation into White Russia, of which it actually became the capital! But the other day the Soviet Government ceded Bialystok to the Lublin-Polish-puppet government. So either the Soviet Government never really thought the plebiscite was a real expression of the people's will or now flaunts that will. If someone suggests that it doesn't make any difference since to all intents and purposes Poland will be a part of Russia, I readily agree; but of course that is another illustration of how illusory we must admit Polish independence is, if we insist on being "realists."

Crimea and Dumbarton Oaks

What was done at Crimea about Dumbarton Oaks? A conference of the United Nations is to be called in San Francisco on April 5, 1945, to take definite steps to establish the "security organization" projected at Dumbarton Oaks. It will be recalled that crucial questions relating to voting procedure in the Dumbarton Oaks security council had been left undecided because Russia contended that any one of the big powers should be permitted to vote in a case involving itself, i.e., should have veto power over the use of any international sanctions. The Crimea Report said that this difficulty had been resolved but how would not be revealed until France and China had been consulted about the call for the San Francisco conference. Within a day or two after the publication of the Crimea Conference report the announcement was made that a "compromise" had been reached. A nation will not have the veto power over a move to bring against it in the Security Council the charge that it is acting as an aggressor or to prevent "non-punitive" measures. *The big powers retain,* however, *the crucial and decisive right to veto the imposition of any punitive action, any real sanctions whether economic or military, against themselves.* This interpretation was confirmed by Secretary of State Stettinius in a formal statement issued on March 5, 1945.

What Mr. Stettinius did not make clear in this and other statements explaining these voting arrangements is a crucial point brought out in the *Christian Science Monitor,* March 13, 1943. The correctness of the *Monitor's* interpretation was confirmed on the same date "by a high government official" and by the State Department's own statement when read carefully. *Not only does each of the Big 5 retain the right to veto the imposition of sanctions against itself, but any one of them can veto not only action with respect to a dispute in which it is not itself involved, but even consideration of such a dispute. "Thus each great power has a veto over every dispute which arises: Those in which it is not involved, over their consideration; those in which it is involved, over the application of sanctions."* The only types of question over which each big power has not a veto are extremely unimportant procedural ones "such as who sits where and how to elect a President of the Council."

The reader will recall our extended discussion in an earlier section of this pamphlet of the crucial question whether Dumbarton Oaks carries out its own pretense of supplying means to enforce peace and stop aggression or is simply a camouflage for a military alliance and a concert of victors to maintain the status quo. Moreover, there is not the slightest specific hint in the Crimea Report that Dumbarton Oaks is to be modified materially at any of the other points which were criticized not only by the Cleveland conference of churchmen but also by the Governments of China, the Netherlands, Mexico, and nine Latin American republics. Crimea gives us no valid reason for altering the judgment that Dumbarton Oaks as it stands is "the perpetuation and ratification of an existing power structure."

The Crimea Report now makes it imperative that churchmen and all who are genuinely interested in peace attach another condition to support of the Dumbarton Oaks plan, namely that their support will be withheld unless the monstrous attempt of Crimea to "legalize" the carving up of Poland and Germany, unilateral actions by the great powers against the little nations, and the industrial crippling and virtual imposition of slavery on the German people are utterly repudiated. As it is now, Dumbarton Oaks is inextricably tied up with these policies. Endorsing Dumbarton Oaks means endorsing their fulfillment. In effect it means that the United States accepts the obligation to guarantee all these decisions and to use armed force and the lives of its young men to implement that guarantee. The Dumbarton Oaks security organization will be used for this purpose as the League of Nations was used as an instrument to enforce the Versailles Treaty and a dictated peace. This is a sure road to war. If the American people understand the facts, they will have none of this. It is the special responsibility of churchmen to publish the facts.

Dumbarton Oaks is bad. But Dumbarton Oaks in the power-politics setting so clearly revealed by Crimea and blessed by churches and churchmen would be immeasurably worse. The facts would remain as they are but the chances are diminished that people will see them and take appropriate action before they are engulfed in disaster.

"Too Horrible To Contemplate?"

But, it is agreed, bad as Dumbarton Oaks-Yalta is, the alternative is much worse, indeed is "too horrible to contemplate." What do people mean by that?

One thing they have in mind is that if Yalta had not been accepted by Roosevelt and is not acquiesced in by the American Congress and people, Russia will not "play ball' any longer. She might even pull out of the war before Hitler is defeated! But obviously Stalin cannot afford to jeopardize the decisive defeat of Germany. If Britain and the United States need his help to accomplish that objective, Russia needs theirs.

If people are pressed further as to what they mean by the alternative to Dumbarton-Yalta which would be "too horrible to contemplate," it becomes apparent that they are afraid of an immediate armed clash with Russia in Europe, or that Russia will withhold support from the war against Japan, possibly even maneuver to prevent a decisive defeat of Japan.

Will Russia attack the United States Army and British forces if the American Congress insists that Yalta must be repudiated? Of course not. In the first place, it would be more than Russia is able to take on after nearly four years of war. In the second place, she does not need to. She is getting everything she can assimilate without it. Is the United States then going to take the offensive against Russia? No responsible politician would dare propose such a step now. Those who believe we might ultimately have to go to war against Russia (and the Forrest Davis articles in *The Saturday Evening Post* about a year ago made it clear that the President is one of these) recognize that the time is not ripe for that; that we need a breathing space, precisely in order that we may gird ourselves for this titanic struggle if it should come.

Therefore, because of those very realities of power politics and the balance of forces, which are reflected in the Yalta decisions, there is not going to be any immediate armed conflict with Russia. What course Russia will pursue toward Japan we shall probably know soon. The fact that the San Francisco Conference is called for the very date when the Russo-Japanese treaty is automatically renewed for five years unless notice to the contrary is given by either party certainly suggests that Russia may be preparing to give such notice in the dramatic setting of San Francisco. If that were done and the American people thus felt assured that Russia would in some significant way "go along" in the war against Japan, it would certainly draw away much of the American criticism of the Yalta decisions and create an atmosphere in which it would be very difficult for any opposition to or criticism of Dumbarton Oaks to register. This is a contingency for which those who hope for modification of Dumbarton Oaks may well prepare their minds. It would constitute showmanship of the most spectacular order!

In any case, it should be clear by now that Russia's course will be determined by her government's concept of what Russian national interests dictate. If she contributes substantially to the war effort against Japan, the price of a "free hand" somewhere in Asia will surely have to be paid. To argue that we must support the Yalta decision in order to get this Russian help, is once again to argue for that policy of appeasement, the futility and the immorality of which have been proclaimed by multitudes of those who are now saying we must yield on Poland. On the basis of their own arguments in the past, we would be on a stronger footing with Stalin if we stood squarely on the principles of the Atlantic Charter and refused to bargain them away.

Lastly, there is the vague fear that the alternative to Dumbarton Oaks is complete chaos, a fear which has been persistently cultivated by governmental and private agencies. The answer to this difficulty also emerges clearly from our analysis. Dumbarton Oaks, depending on how one chooses to put it, is either a sham, a mere mask which has no substance—no one any longer pretends that it provides any means for curbing "aggression" on the part of the big powers—or else the security organization which it projects will be the instrument through which the Big Three military alliance will try to rule the world and to do it more effectively by decking out the wolf in sheep's clothing. If the first is true, then Dumbarton Oaks is nothing, and staying out of it does not alter anything that matters; if the second, then the military alliance will be there even if the sheep's clothing is removed and the whole thing will be clearly seen for what it is—a work of the devil and a covenant of death which ought to be repudiated.

What To Do Now?

This pamphlet is written in the deep-seated conviction that the unrelieved, abysmal pessimism implied in the position that it is "Dumbarton Oaks or nothing" is unwarranted, the conviction that we do not have to accept and must not accept as "the best we can get" the perpetuation and ratification of the precarious military alliance among the Big Three, which is what Dambarton Oaks essentially represents. It is written, also, in the deep-seated conviction that the time to begin working for something better, to turn around and begin walking in the right direction, is now. The longer we continue on the descent on which we now find ourselves, the harder it will be to change and thus avert World War III. It is my conviction, furthermore, that the churches, and men and women generally who believe in the reality of the moral law and of spiritual forces must provide, and alone can provide, the leadership for this crucial hour.

For what is it that is needed first and above all? True, we need common sense and realism. In certain respects, as we have pointed out, it is the failure of churchmen, and of progressives generally, realistically to face up to the facts of the international situation which threatens to trick mankind into accepting a crude betrayal of its hopes. But this is not our first and greatest need. It is faith and hope, which must be born anew—faith that the world is God's world and hope that mankind can rid itself of war and build a just and durable peace.

George Bernanos in a *Letter to the Americans* which is a part of his recently published *Plea for Liberty* points out that in such a situation as the present men must have a great hope, a burning one, yes, even a Utopian dream, in order to generate the energy which is required for the herculean task of stopping the disintegration and beginning to construct a genuinely new order. The common people know how desperate their case is. They are well aware that no slight or superficial measures will accomplish anything. Unless they are able to believe that something drastic, something important, can happen, they will either be plunged deeper into a sense of futility, into cynicism and despair or

else they will break loose into violent and uncontrollable destructive efforts to get out of their condition.

The common people are, Bernanos points out, "torn apart by cynical inconsistencies." They may "through rage, through despair, through the desire for change at any cost" resort to any measures, however irrational. True, "the lie is now so universal we cannot reestablish the truth without grave danger." But precisely in such circumstances when the house of civilization is threatened with complete collapse, large-scale and heroic measures must be taken. "The most imprudent thing of all would be to poke a little to the right and a little to the left. . . . Rather we must tackle the whole job at once, *we must thrust the peoples of Europe into a vast undertaking, a total undertaking, worthy of their merits. . . . The hope aroused in men's hearts must be proportionate to their present despair.*"

Now surely it is for the Church which believes that God rules and that God's will is righteousness, brotherhood, and peace, to call men to vast undertakings for the Kingdom and to inspire in them by God's grace the hope proportionate to their present despair. Alas, too often in these days, compromised as it is by involvement in the war, the Church outdoes the politicians in "realism," in accepting and even advocating compromises and half-measures. Bernanos cries out against this: "I am well aware that it is fashionable among the bourgeoisie, and even among Christians—who could believe it!—to make much of those who promise the moon. How strange it is to hear such sneers coming from the mouths of certain priests, the same sacrilegious mouths which on Christmas day must repeat *a certain promise—a thousand times more daring than the promise of the moon—the promise which assures Peace to men of good will.*"

Bread or a Stone?

Unwittingly perhaps, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in the Crimea Conference Report confirmed the fact that the peoples of the world are deeply disturbed and distressed over the course of events and are longing for an inspiring call to action based on idealism, hope, and faith, and the promise of "peace to men of good will." The shock which was felt and expressed by multitudes in the United States and elsewhere over the repudiation of the Atlantic Charter in practice, and the slightly concealed contempt characterizing references to it in high quarters, had registered with the leaders of the big powers. They felt they had to do something to allay the popular resentment. The Report of the Crimea Conference accordingly put the Atlantic Charter—on paper at least—back on the throne with resounding acclaim. "By this declaration," the Report says, "we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build . . . world order under law dedicated to peace. . . ." There is no hint here either of the line which President Roosevelt and, alas, a good many churchmen had been taking, to the effect that the Atlantic Charter was a goal, an ideal, to shoot at but not to put into practice now. For a moment, at least, taking the Atlantic Charter seriously as a guide for current practice was not decried as "perfectionism."

Alas, that we must remind ourselves that the Crimea Conference Report put the stamp of approval upon such measures as the unilateral action of Russia in Poland, and that the Conference itself virtually settled Poland's fate without consultation with its people or their representatives. These and other actions of the Conference clearly violated the principles of the Atlantic Charter in which the August conferees so eloquently reaffirmed their faith. John Foster Dulles, in a Personal Memorandum issued from the Office of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, February 26, 1945, quoted chapter and verse to substantiate his charge that Points 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Atlantic Charter were all violated. And it is the actions which count and determine the course of events, not the words. As if to make sure that it would be our own fault if we took the lip-service to the Atlantic Charter too seriously, Mr. Churchill, almost before the ink on the Crimea Conference Report was dry, replied in the House of Commons to a question from one of his fellow-conservatives, Professor Douglas Lloyd Savory, "whether the big powers were not bound by the Atlantic Charter to consider the wishes of the Polish people before transferring them from their homes to other territory" in these familiar words: "The Atlantic Charter is a guide, not a rule"—in any case not something to apply to the actions of one's own government now!

Surely, we emphasize once again, the role to which the churches and churchmen are called at this critical moment could hardly be made clearer than it has been made by these events. The peoples want a genuine peace, such as might grow out of fidelity to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. They cried for this bread so importunately that national rulers had to take heed and give them something. They gave the peoples a stone, however, and not bread. But the peoples still want bread. Their religious leaders must not also put them off with a stone in place of bread. It is their duty to expose the treason which is being prepetrated by the political leaders.

But criticism is not enough. A positive lead must be given. Churchmen must see the promise in the profound longing of the people for a word of faith and hope, and for action in fidelity to high principles. Christians must not take counsel of their fears, saying, "It is Dumbarton Oaks and Crimea or nothing." Still less must they permit the rulers of warring powers, and their own fears, to terrorize them into blessing Dumbarton Oaks and Crimea. Let them call for Peace Now. Let them, at the very least, insist that we must take a step, even if it be a small one, forward and not away from genuine world organization. Surely it is for them to call the peoples "to a vast undertaking, a total undertaking, worthy of their merits" and thus to arouse in men's hearts a hope "proportionate to their present despair."

A Practical Program

Given renewed faith and hope, a practical program for achieving a just and durable peace can follow. It might be something like this:

1. A clear and explicit statement of peace aims or peace terms. The government of the United States should make its own preliminary draft of such a statement and the forthcoming San Francisco conference of the United Nations should consider this and other drafts.

2. The principles of the Atlantic Charter should be regarded as a minimum basis for such a statement of peace aims.

3. Emphasis should be placed upon constructive measures to right economic wrongs, provide access for all nations to raw materials, etc., rather than upon an effort to main-

tain peace by force. Only a peace by consent, which meets the real needs of peoples and commends itself to their sense of justice, can endure. "We can have revenge or peace; we cannot have both."

Professor David Mitrany of the School of Economics and Politics of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, in a pamphlet entitled *A Working Peace System* contends that far too little attention is given to functional organization and action for "the conquest of poverty and of disease and of ignorance. . . . The elements of a functional system (international) could begin to work without a general political authority, but a political authority without active social functions would remain an empty temple. Society will develop by our living it, not by policing it." These things can be done—possibly through the proposed Economic-Social Council without joining the Dumbarton Oaks security organization. Let it again be said that the slogan "Dumbarton Oaks or nothing" is utterly misleading.

4. If the Dumbarton Oaks plan is to be used as a starting point for discussion it should be amended along the lines suggested by the Cleveland Conference.

5. *These proposals should then be proclaimed to all nations, and their governments and peoples invited to enter into an armistice to make peace at once on this basis.*

As soon as a proposal to stop fighting and make peace is made, the sixty-four dollar question is sure to be popped. It is, *"Would you do business with Hitler and the Nazis?"* My answer to that question is that *it is the "unconditional surrender" policies now being pursued which keep Hitler and the Nazis in power in Germany.* And the same principle applies to Japan. The "unconditional surrender" slogan and its implications; the merciless obliteration of city after city by our bombers; the sight of what Russia, Britain, and the United States are doing to the little nations; the killing off of the democratic elements by Allied troops in Poland, Greece and Italy; the appeasement of monarchists and Fascists; the proposals to partition Germany; the threat of Russian domination of eastern and central Europe —such things as these convince the German people that their case in any event is hopeless and that Hitler was essentially correct when he contended that the Allies were pursuing their own national self-interest and that their real object was the destruction of the German nation.

Nor is this all. The policies of the Allies strike dismay and terror into the hearts of democratic elements in Germany, and all over the world, and thus sap the energies of men for the struggle against Facism and war. A situation is thus created out of which more dreadful elements than the evil ones created by the Nazis will emerge as surely as World War I and its aftermath soon resulted in our having not the Kaiser and the Junkers but Hitler and the Nazis to deal with.

The Banner of Hope

Only raising the banner of a great hope—as at a certain moment the Wilsonian Fourteen Points did—that imperialism, power politics, and exploitation are to be abandoned by victors as well as vanquished can change this situation. There is nothing which Hitler fears more. Nothing which would more quickly deprive him of all support, including support for carrying on the war—and deprive not only him but also the reactionaries and imperialists and practitioners of power politics everywhere. Might it be that the leaders of the Allied Nations also are aware of this?

If the reader is perhaps thinking that our proposals for ending the war and making peace are fantastic, several things should be said. First, we do not believe that our proposals involve no risks, or constitute an easy, cheap, and painless solution of the world's problem. There is no such solution to be had. Secondly, we are well aware that what we have proposed cannot be accomplished at one stroke and that their execution presents complicated problems. There is no other solution of which the same thing may not be said. What we are convinced of is that this is the direction in which we must move and that the will so to move is the first essential. Once we stop going in the wrong direction and get started in the right we shall not be found complaining if the train does not always move at express speed. Thirdly, *if the proposal to stop the war on the basis we have set forth seems fantastic, we humbly suggest again that it is not half so fantastic as the proposal to go on with the war, which means inevitably now backing up the policies of the Big Three and shedding the blood of the world's youth for them—policies which make a mockery of human hopes and constitute a betrayal of the common people of all lands.*

Finally, whether or not any substantial improvement in the international outlook can be immediately achieved, each individual, and certainly all who seek to live by the spirit of Christ, must decide what his or her personal attitude toward war and voluntary participation in it is to be. If you who read are a non-pacifist, do not the events which are taking place today compel you to re-open this question? Do they not teach us for good and all that war is as futile as it is evil? That this war has not really proved to be "different" and that we must never again expose ourselves to the risk of falling into this way of thinking about any war?

If western civilization, plunged into World War III, is presently threatened with utter destruction, is it not clear that, as in the case of the early Christians, the seed of which a new order of life will eventually be born must be carried in small fellowships composed of those who are willing to be fools in the eyes of the world; who are cured of the illusion that evil can overcome evil, Satan cast out Satan, who give themselves humbly to the practice of love and who, even if they be crucified, do not lose faith in its conquering power?

Additional copies of this article available at following rates:

10 cents each; 12 for $1.00; 100 for $7.50

The FELLOWSHIP of RECONCILIATION, 2929 Broadway, New York 25, N. Y.